In this paper empirical evidence is presented on the elasticity of private R&D spending on its price. A censored panel-data regression model with random e¤ects is applied to a balanced panel of 726 Italian …rms over the 1992-97 period. Implied estimates point out that Italian …rms' response to policy measures (including tax credits), aimed at reducing the user cost of R&D capital, is likely to be substantial (1.50-1.77). Furthermore, we also …nd that the elasticity of R&D spending is higher in recession (2.01) than in expansion (0.87).
Introduction
There is general consensus among economists that market mechanisms fail to provide the socially optimal level of R&D spending, basically because private …rms are not able to fully capture all the pro…ts arising from the results of their R&D activity. Government intervention in this area is thus justi…ed from an economic point of view by the market failure aspect of R&D: because the social returns to private R&D are often higher than the private returns, some research projects would bene…t society but would be privately unpro…table. By lowering the cost to the …rm, a subsidy can make these projects pro…table as well.
There is far less consensus on how should policy bridge the gap between the private and the social rate of return. Until recently, in most European countries including Italy, direct government funding through grants or soft loans have been the prevailing types of incentives, with tax credits playing a somewhat marginal role. The standard economic rationale underlying this preference is that direct funding is discretionary as it is usually accompanied by a government project choice. In turn, this would allow policy makers to channel public subsidies towards projects where the gap between the social and the private return is perceived to be greater (see David et al., 2000) . In recent years, however, a progressive shift towards tax credits has been observed in several countries. For instance, automatic tax credits reducing the cost of R&D spending were e¤ec-tively introduced in Italy only in 1997. Indeed, in the present days where the blame for economic ine¢ciencies is more often put on government than on market failures, a tax-based subsidy seems a feasible market-oriented response since it leaves the choice of how to carry out R&D programs in the hand of the private sector.
As noted by Hall and Van Reenen (2000) in their review of the existing empirical evidence on this issue, the e¤ectiveness of tax incentives cannot be taken for granted since it crucially depends on the tax-price elasticity of R&D private spending. If it is very low it would take an implausibly large …scal relief to generate a sizeable e¤ect. Incidentally, this was the overall conclusion emerging from the …rst wave of studies of the US tax credit program using data through 1983. More recent studies on both the US and other industrialized countries seem instead to converge in concluding that the tax price elasticity of total R&D spending is on the order of unity, maybe even higher (see Hall and Van Reenen, 2000) .
The main objective of this paper is to provide econometric evidence on this unresolved issue for Italy. For this purpose we apply a censored panel-data regression model with random e¤ects to a balanced panel of 726 Italian …rms over the 1992-97 period. Compared to most of previous literature in this area which focuses exclusively on large …rms, our panel has the advantage of a broader coverage, since it also includes a sizeable number of unlisted small/medium sized companies. The main result of this paper is that estimated elasticity is high, being systematically greater than 1 (1.50-1.77) in all our estimates where the elasticity parameter is assumed to be constant over time. In addition, we also …nd evidence that the elasticity is greater in recession (2.01) than in expansion (0.87).
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Next section brie ‡y illustrates recent trends in public …nancing of R&D expenditures in Italy. Section 3 focuses on how our crucial variable -the user cost of R&D capital -is constructed. Section 4 describes the sample of …rms used for the estimation of the empirical model and presents the relevant descriptive statistics. In section 5 the empirical model and its underlying assumptions are introduced. Section 6 discusses the econometric results and section 7 concludes.
Public Incentives to R&D in Italy
As already mentioned in the introduction, direct funding through grants or soft loans have been the prevailing types of R&D incentives in Italy. According to the surveys on state aids published by the European Union (EU, hereafter) Commission, in the 1992 Commission, in the -94 (1994 period these instruments accounted respectively for 65.0 (85.7) and 35.0 (14.3) per cent of total R&D subsidies to the private sector. Only in more recent years , government intervention in this …eld has taken the form of …scal bene…ts. However, the percentage of aid granted through tax measures (5 per cent of total R&D subsidies) is still small when compared with the other more usual instruments.
1 Furthermore, as it can be seen in Table 1 where these broad …gures are reported for the four large EU countries (France, Germany, Italy and the UK), the preference accorded to direct and often discretionary measures was fairly widespread in the EU in the period under study. For instance, the EU Commission allocates each national aid scheme to a single objective. This might lead to underestimate the amount of R&D public incentives, if R&D programs speci…cally directed towards small …rms (or to …rms located in less favored regions) are allocated under the SME (or regional aid) heading and therefore are not included in the R&D total.
2 In Table 1 , A1+A2 represent aids which are transferred in full to the recipient. A1 means that aid is granted though the budget (grants + direct interest subsidies). The aid is denoted as A2 if it is given through the tax or social security system. C1+C2 are transfers in which the aid element is the interest saved by the recipient during the period in which the capital transferred is at her/his disposal. The …nancial transfer can take the form of a soft loan (C1) or tax deferral (C2).
These …gures obviously re ‡ect the characteristics of the Italian legislation on public incentives to R&D and its evolution over time.
3 In fact, grants and soft loans are the …nancial instruments used by the main R&D program (law 46/82) operating consistently through the nineties to channel public funds to private R&D projects. Even if this program has been recently amended to ful…ll EU requirements, its main features have remained broadly unaltered over the decade.
Roughly speaking, …rms apply for the …nancing of R&D expenditures (including labor, equipment and other current costs). If the proposed project is accepted, …rms bene…t from both types of incentives (grants + soft loans) to cover up to a maximum share of planned R&D costs. Additional bene…ts to small …rms and/or to …rms localized in less developed areas (i.e. Southern Italy) are provided, the rationale here being that these types of …rms are likely to face more severe market imperfections in …nancing their R&D activities. As it will become apparent in the next section, these di¤erences across …rms will be exploited in the construction of the user cost of capital variable. For this reason, Table 2 reports in details the amount of incentives available to di¤erent types of …rms in the sample period used for estimation. In this paper, the user cost of R&D is calculated using the approach pioneered by Hall and Jorgenson (1967) and King and Fullerton (1984) . The aim of this approach is to derive for any given investment project the minimum pre-tax real rate of return in order to provide the saver lending money to the …rm with the same post-tax return he would receive from lending at the market interest rate.
In order to achieve identi…cation of the price elasticity, variation of the R&D user cost across …rms and/or over time is required. In most of previous literature this is obtained by relying mainly on di¤erences in tax treatment, usually induced by di¤erences in the implicit subsidy given by the tax system to R&D. As it should have become apparent from the previous section, this is unlikely to be a promising identi…cation strategy in our case. In fact, not only R&D tax credits were relatively unimportant in the period under study (1992) (1993) (1994) (1995) (1996) (1997) , but also reliable …rm level information on tax position is not available. This would leave us only with changes of the general tax legislation over time, a very thin reed on which to base the estimation of the price elasticity of R&D demand. For this reason, we complemented it with three additional sources of across-…rms variation: di¤erences in market interest rates (depending on …rm's location and size), in …rm's optimal capital structure, and in the amount of discretionary subsidies potentially accorded by the main R&D program (law 46/82) implemented in the 1992-97 period (again depending on …rm's location and size). On the contrary, since …rm level information on R&D composition is not available, it is assumed to be constant across …rms and made by 90% as of current expenditures (personnel), 6.4% as of machinery and equipment, and 3.6% as of buildings (see OECD, 1996b ).
Given the availability of direct and discretionary subsidies in the sample period used for the estimation (1992-97), a preliminary methodological issue has to be faced at this stage. In particular, since these incentives do not apply automatically to all eligible …rms but are both discretionary and subject to budget constraints, it is not obvious how they should enter in the computation of the R&D user cost of capital. To circumvent this problem we have computed two alternative measures for the user cost. The …rst measure (User Cost without Incentives) does not take into account the potential availability of direct subsidies and is therefore likely to overestimate the "true" user cost faced by each …rm. The second measure (User Cost with Incentives) incorporates existing subsidies (grants and soft loans)
as if they were automatically and fully available to all eligible …rms. In bold we highlighted the e¤ect of soft loans in eq.1 in reducing the …nancial cost of debt and of subsidies in eq.3-4 in "implicitly" raising depreciation allowances (so reducing the user cost). Obviously this alternative is instead likely to underestimate the "true" cost. In the econometric exercise presented in section 6, we experiment with both de…nitions in order to check whether the estimated demand elasticity is sensitive to changes in the de…nition of the user cost.
As it is well known, the …rst step in measuring the user cost of capital is to compute the …nancial cost for each available form of …nancing: retained earnings, new debt, and new share issues. Financial costs are derived from the following set of equilibrium conditions between the opportunity cost of investing in the project and a safe investment:
As already mentioned, we allow the market interest rate, r in eq.1 to vary both over time and across …rms. The rationale for this is that di¤erent types of …rms are perceived to face di¤erent lending conditions depending, among other things, on location and size. To capture the location e¤ect we used the Bank of Italy's yearly active rates on cash …nancing disaggregated by geographical areas ("North West", "North-East", "Center", "South"), reported in the supplement to the Statistic Bulletin. Unfortunately, similar data disaggregated according to …rm size are not available. In order to capture the size e¤ect, we computed instead an implicit cost of debt for each …rm-year in the sample by using balance sheet data. To minimize accounting as well as endogeneity problems, we then computed median values (both across …rms and over time) for three di¤erent …rm size classes ("Small", "Medium", and "Large"). Finally, we applied di¤erences between size classes proportionately to the -location speci…c -yearly active rates on cash …nancing. The …nal result is a set of twelve di¤erent market interest rates (one for each size-location) for each year.
Financial costs are then used to compute the user cost of capital, p k speci…c to each form of …nancing. This is a weighted average of prices of the di¤erent components of R&D expenditure and also depends on economic depreciation (±), in ‡ation (¼), corporate tax (t) and depreciation allowances as follows:
5 The notation adopted in this section as well as the numerical values for the parameters used in computing the R&D user cost of capital are reported in Appendix 1.
A k s is the present value of depreciation allowances and for convenience it also includes taxable grants (in bold in eq. 3-4). We allow only current expenditure and machinery/equipment to bene…t this grant, as indicated in the relevant program (law 46/82). Note in eq.3-5 that machinery and buildings are depreciated over a speci…ed number of time periods according to appropriate …scal depreciation rates (0.15 and 0.04 respectively), while current spending is fully depreciated in the same …scal period of the investment.
Finally, to compute the R&D user cost of capital faced by each …rm, it is necessary to weight the user costs speci…c to each form of …nancing as follows:
In this paper we allow …rms to di¤er in their optimal …nancial structure and compute it as the average share (over the sample period) of the di¤erent …nancial sources as reported in balance sheet data (see also next section).
Sample Characteristics and Descriptive Statistics
The data come from the 6th and 7th surveys "Indagine sulle Imprese Manifatturiere" by Mediocredito Centrale, MCC from now on. 6 These are two surveys conducted in 1995 and 1998 through questionnaires handed to a representative sample of manufacturing …rms within the national borders and supplemented with standard balance sheet data. In each wave the sample is selected with a strati…ed method for …rms with up to 500 workers, whereas …rms above this threshold are all included. Strata are based on geographical area, industry and …rm size. Each survey contains about 5000 manufacturing …rms. Questionnaires collect information over the previous three years. We merged the two MCC's samples and obtained a reduced sample of 941 …rms, keeping only those …rms answering to both questionnaires and therefore with complete observations over the [1992] [1993] [1994] [1995] [1996] [1997] period. The criterion used to merge is based on available …scal codes and …rms' identi…cation numbers. We further reduced the sample according to R&D data quality. In particular we cross-checked answers and excluded those …rms which said to have spent on R&D in the questionnaire and gave no amount whatsoever.
Analogously, we deleted those …rms not mentioning whether they invested or not and yet giving some amount, the fact being dubious. We also eliminated those …rms with all missing values on R&D spending. Finally, we had to eliminate 40 …rms lacking the balance sheet information needed to build weights in the user cost of R&D capital. The …nal sample contains 726 …rms, 27.8% of which spent on R&D in each sub-period (1992-94 and 1996-97) , and 60.2% spent on R&D in at least one period.
7 Table 3 reports the (percentage) distribution of the …nal sample of …rms by industry, size and area. As in Archibugi and Ceccagnoli (1995) , we used the ISTAT (the Italian Statistical Bureau) industry classi…cation scheme and accordingly we grouped …rms in 21 two-digit manufacturing industries. Size is de…ned as endof-year number of employees. By using the EU classi…cation (see footnote 4)
we partitioned …rms in three size classes: "Small" (up to 50 workers),"Medium"
(between 50 and 250), and "Large" (above 250 workers). Finally, by exploiting available information on head quarter localization, …rms were also classi…ed in one of the following four geographical areas: "North West", "North East", "Center", and "South". As it can be seen in Table 3 "Medium" …rms make 43.6%
of the sample whereas the shares of "Large" and "Small" …rms are respectively 7 More detailed information on the e¤ects of merging and cleaning procedures on the size/location distribution of …rms can be found in Appendix 2.
24.7% and 31.7%. All industries are represented with "Mechanics" (23.4%) and "Textiles" (13.5%) ranking respectively …rst and second. Finally, about three quarters of sample …rms are localized in Northern Italy (54.6% in the "North West" and 25.3% in the "North East"). More importantly for the purpose of the present paper, these …gures indicate that only 29.8% of sample …rms falls under the "default" category (large …rms not located in Southern Italy) as de…ned by law 46/82, whereas additional bene…ts were potentially available to 64.8% (SMEs not localized in the "South") and, even more generously, to 5.4% (…rms localized in Southern Italy) of the full sample. 0.41 0.41 0.14 6.9 Metals 0.68 2.34 1.10 0.27 0.41 0.41 0.14 0.14 0.14 0.14 0.14 5.9 Metal products 0.27 1.65 0.55 0.55 0.55 0.14 0.14 0.14 4.0 Mechanics 2.48 7.30 3.30 1.52 3.86 2.62 1.38 0.27 0.27 0.14 0.14 0.14 23.4 O¢ce machinery 0.41 0.14 0.14 0.7 Electronics 0.68 0.68 0.55 0.27 0.27 0.41 0.14 0.41 0.14 3.6 TV, radio 0.41 0.14 0.83 0.14 0.14 1.6 Medical instrum 0.14 0.14 0.14 0.14 0.27 0.8 Vehicles 0.41 0.83 1.10 0.14 0.55 0.41 0.14 0.14 0.27 4.0 Other transport 0.14 0.41 0.14 0.27 0.14 0.14 1.2 Furniture 0.27 0.14 0.41 0.55 0.27 0.27 0.55 0.14 2.6 Total Size 15.3 25.2 14.1 7.3 11.6 6.4 7.2 4.4 3.1 1.9 2.4 1.1 Total Area 54.6 25.3 14.7 5.4 100 Table 4 below shows descriptive statistics for R&D intensity over time. R&D intensity is de…ned as the ratio between R&D spending and sales (in percentage terms). In both questionnaires a detailed de…nition of R&D activity is given. lower. This feature of our data-set is roughly consistent with macroeconomic evidence on the negative R&D growth rate in Italy (-0.8%) between 1991 and 1996 (OECD, 1996a (OECD, , 1998 . Also, it must be taken into account that 1994-97 were expansionary years whereas in 1992-93 the Italian economy was in deep recession. Since sales tend to be more volatile than R&D expenditures, this explains, at least partially, the observed downward trend for our R&D to sales variable.
Secondly, conditional distributions are skewed to the right with a limited number of …rms investing a relatively large amount of resources in R&D. Given the crucial role played by the user cost of capital variable in allowing the identi…cation of the R&D price elasticity, in Table 5 basic descriptive statistics are di base, Ricerca applicata, Sviluppo sperimentale. Per Ricerca di base si considera un'attivita' sperimentale o teorica avente come scopo l'allargamento dei limiti della conoscenza in cui si prevede una speci…ca applicazione o utilizzazione; per Ricerca applicata si intende quella originale svolta per ampliare i limiti della conoscenza, ma anche e principalmente allo scopo di una pratica e speci…ca applicazione; per Sviluppo sperimentale si intende un'attivita' destinata a completare, sviluppare o perfezionare materiali, prodotti e processi produttivi, sistemi e servizi attraverso l'applicazione e l'utilizzazione dei risultati della ricerca e dell'esperienza pratica." This de…nition is in line with the EU directive of May 1992.
reported for our two alternative measures, respectively excluding and including the potential bene…ts deriving from existing government incentives. The impact of grants and soft loans is to reduce both the mean (as obviously expected) and the overall standard deviation (respectively from 0.342 to 0.242 and from 0.027 to 0.024). More importantly for our purposes, we have also computed withinand between-…rm standard deviations. Given our sources of variation (especially di¤erences in market interest rates, in …nancial structures and, when appropriate, in the amount of available subsidies), it is probably not surprising that variation between …rms dominates variation within …rms (but over time). This happens to be the case particularly when the user cost with incentives is considered. Finally, Table 6 reports summary descriptive statistics on the weights (! de ; ! re ;and ! ns ) used to compute eq. 6 for each …rm in the sample. These weights are obtained by exploiting available stock balance sheet data. For each …rm yearly weights are …rstly computed. Subsequently, …rm level yearly weights are averaged over time with the purpose of controlling for short run deviation from the optimal …nancial structure. Therefore, …nancial structures are allowed to vary across …rms but not over time. On average, equity capital (retained earnings and new share issues) accounts for slightly more than 50% of total liabilities. 
(i = 1; :::; n; t = 1; :::; T )
where y ¤ it is a latent variable measuring the (log of the) amount …rm i is willing to invest in R&D at time t.
9 What we observe instead is y it = y ¤ it only if y ¤ it > 0 and we set y it = 0 otherwise. p it is the (log of the) user cost of R&D capital as measured in the previous section. 
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A …nal issue which is worth mentioning at this stage refers to the interpretation of the estimated coe¢cients. It is well known that ¼ (and the same obviously applies to each element of the¯vector) measures
which is of limited interest since y ¤ it is not observable. Since y it is equal to the log of R&D spending if it is positive and zero otherwise, also the following alternative measure:
is not very meaningful. ; it can be proved that this measure can be computed as:
10 See however the estimator proposed in Honoré (1992) where the dependent variable is arti…cially censored in such a way that the individual e¤ect can be di¤erenced out. See also Honoré and Kiriazidou (1999) and Arellano e Honoré (1999) .
11 To test for the robustness of our estimates of the price elasticity of the R&D user cost of capital to the strict exogeneity assumption on the x vector, in section 6 we will alternatively assume that´i = x 0 i¸+ " i with E(" i v it ) = 0 (see also Wooldridge, 1995).
where¸is the inverse Mill's ratio and Á and © denote respectively the standard normal density and cumulative density functions. In addition, the e¤ect of a change in the user cost of R&D capital on the probability that an observation will be positive -i.e. that a …rm will engage in R&D activity -can also be computed as follows:
Given that these two parameters vary with …rms and over time, we will calculate them by taking the predicted value of the regression on the means, ¼p + x 0¯.
Results
Our …ndings are summarized in Tables 7 and 8 . The results of alternative estimates of the coe¢cients of eq.7 are shown in Table 7 with attached standard errors and summary statistics (from column 1 to column 5) whereas Table 8 reports implied elasticities (see eq.10) and changes in probability (see eq.11). In all columns of Table 7 the dependent variable is equal to zero if the amount of R&D spending is zero and to the log of real R&D expenditure otherwise. Column 1 is our benchmark model which includes as explanatory variables the (log of the) user cost variable with incentives together with real sales and operational cash ‡ow gross of R&D costs (both in log) as control variables. The sales variable is a proxy for size and is expected to be positive given the greater R&D …nanc-ing possibilities for large …rms and the perspective of higher returns to R&D associated with larger markets. It is instead an open question whether the elasticity of R&D e¤ort to size is expected to signi…cantly di¤er from 1. The cash ‡ow variable is also expected to be positively signed. However, the economic interpretation is dubious since a positive sign is consistent both with contemporaneous cash ‡ow being a signal for future investment opportunities or with cash ‡ow signalling imperfect substitutability between internal and external …nancial sources. 12 Location ("North-East", "Center", and "South"), time and two-digit industry dummies are also included as additional control variables. Time dummies capture macroeconomic demand shocks whereas industry dummies control for time-invariant industry-speci…c factors including the available set of localized technological opportunities.
Estimates reported in columns 2-5 are meant to provide a series of alternative robustness checks of our basic results. 13 In column 2 the user cost of capital without incentives replaces the user cost with incentives as a regressor. As already mentioned in section 3, comparing the two estimated elasticities provides a straight robustness test to alternative de…nitions of our crucial variable. In column 3, instead, we have re-estimated our basic model only on the sub-sample of …rms operating in high-tech industries. 14 Since the majority of R&D active …rms is concentrated in a limited number of industries it might be argued that potential di¤erences between R&D performing and R&D non-performing …rms merely pick up structural di¤erences across industries and not di¤erences between R&D and non-R&D …rms. To rule out this alternative explanation we have therefore checked whether our implied elasticities are substantially di¤erent when estimated on the sub-sample of high-tech industries. In column 4 we address the endogeneity issue by allowing the individual e¤ect to depend linearly on x i , the objective being to test whether our estimates of the R&D price elasticity are sensitive to the assumption of strict exogeneity on the x vector. Operationally, this implies that our basic model has to be extended by including two additional regressors, that is the within-…rm means for real sales and operational cash ‡ow. Building In all columns our main variables have all the expected sign. In particular, sales 13 If the tobit speci…cation is correct, then the probit estimators should be consistent for 1 ¾u · 1¸f rom the tobit model. Therefore, to check for misspeci…cation of the tobit model we also run probit equations. Overall results con…rm all our basic …ndings. 14 High-tech industries include Chemicals, Mechanics, O¢ce machinery, Electronics, TV and radio, Medical instruments, Vehicles, Other transport.
15 A recessionary year is de…ned as one in which there has been more than one quarter of negative GDP growth. Recessionary years in our sample period are 1992 and 1993. and cash ‡ow coe¢cients are positively signed and signi…cant at the conventional statistical level and the user cost variable is negative and highly signi…cant. Furthermore, the "South" dummy is negative and signi…cant with the exception of column 3 where parameters are estimated on the sub-sample of high-tech industries. rejects the null. * means 10% signi…cance. As already explained in section 5, estimated coe¢cients are economically not very meaningful. What we are really interested in is to recover estimates of the relevant elasticities conditional on performing R&D activity. For this reason Table   8 reports mean estimates of eq.10 (upper part of the Table) and eq.11 (lower part of the Table) with respect to the continuous explanatory variables included in our speci…cation. Conditional on doing R&D, implied elasticities with respect to contemporary sales and cash ‡ow are respectively 0.41-0.46 and 0.06-0.07 when estimated on the full sample of …rms. Furthermore, the R&D elasticity to sales is substantially higher (0.71), but still below 1, when estimated on the sub-sample of …rms operating in high-tech industries. More importantly for the purpose of the present paper, the conditional elasticity of R&D to its user cost turns out to be high since it ranges from 1.50 to 1.77 in absolute value when estimated on the full sample period. This result should be compared and contrasted with the available empirical evidence for other countries (especially the US) where variability in the user cost is obtained trough variation in the tax treatment across …rms and over time. For instance, recent work using US …rm level data reaches the conclusion that the tax price elasticity of total R&D spending during the eighties is on the order of unity, maybe higher (see Hall and Van Reenen, 2000) . Finally, we also …nd evidence of instability over time of the elasticity parameter, which turns out to be greater in recessionary years (2.01) than in expansionary years (0.87).
Conclusion
In this paper empirical evidence is presented on the elasticity of private R&D spending on its price. Implied estimates point out that Italian …rms' response to policy measures (including tax credits) aimed at reducing the user cost of R&D capital is likely to be substantial. Taken to its face value, other things being equal, our …nding implies that a 5 per cent reduction in the user cost is expected to increase the spending of R&D active …rms by as much as 7.5-8.8 per cent. Of course this is not the full e¤ect. In fact, a reduction in costs will also a¤ect …rm's output thus amplifying the R&D expansionary e¤ect. Furthermore, it will also increase the probability that new …rms will start investing in R&D activity.
However, some cautionary remarks are necessary. First, one has to recognize the limitations in the used econometric technique. These limitations are a direct consequence of the di¢culties in estimating …xed e¤ects versions of censored and, more generally, of non-linear models on the one hand and of the strong assumptions that has to be taken in a random e¤ects approach on the other hand. Second, and possibly more important for policy perspectives, it must be recognized that identi…cation of the elasticity parameter has been mainly achieved through size and location variability in market interest rates. This might lead to overestimate the price elasticity to the extent that variability in market interest rates captures additional size or location disadvantages not fully controlled for by the sales and the location dummy variables.
Obviously, to shed further light on this issue alternative identi…cation strategies have to be pursued. This might become possible in the future when more recent data with detailed …rm level information on tax credits, following the implementation of the 1997 programs, will become available.
Following is the legend of the parameters used in the calculation of the R&D user cost of capital in Section 3. It also includes the notation for public aid elements derived from Table 2 the cross sections and cleaning data. We used the number of workers at the end of each year to build a "size" class. If the …rm reported less than 51 workers, it was considered "Small", if it had at least 51 workers but less than 251, it fell into "Medium" size and with more than 250 workers it was considered "Large". We used MCC variable "Area" to locate …rms in one of the main geographical areas (macro regions).
MCC selects …rms in the surveys with up to 500 workers through strati…cation by area, industry and size. Firms with at least 500 workers are all included. In 92-94 survey, 46% of the …rms are small and 85% are SMEs. In 95-97 survey, 64% of the …rms are small and 90% are SMEs. The higher number of small …rms in the second survey is likely to be due to the fact that those ones especially addressed MCC for …nancial support in more recent years.
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In order to build a balanced panel for the 6 years of observation, we merged the two cross-sections by …rms' MCC identity number and …scal code, keeping 941 …rms. We needed a further cleaning because of inconsistencies in …rms' answers about their R&D activity. For example, we excluded …rms indicating to have spent on R&D and yet reporting missing or zero amount. We also excluded …rms without balance sheet information on their …nancial structure.
By comparing the columns in the Table A2 .1 large …rms are over-represented and small …rms are under-represented both in the merged panel and in our …nal sample of 726 …rms. This is mainly due to the MCC criterion to select the universe of …rms with more than 500 workers, all falling into our "Large" class. Indeed, conditional on surviving, the probability of belonging to both surveys for large …rms is equal to one whereas it is lower than one for …rms in the other classes and it depends on sampling procedures. Since large …rms are mainly located in the North West, after sample selection the North West is over-represented at the expense of the other three geographical areas (see Table A2 .2).
16 See footnote 6. 
